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HOW TO STUDY CONSTITUTION-MAKING:
HIRSCHL, ELSTER, AND THE SEVENTH INNING
PROBLEM
TOM GINSBURG*

It is very difficult to comment on a book with which one fundamentally
agrees. Ran Hirschl’s magnificent Comparative Matters is not only a deep
work of intellectual history, but it also makes a powerful methodological
argument. Hirschl calls for integrating the study of comparative constitutional
law into a broader field of comparative constitutional studies, in which
rigorous but pluralistic social sciences are deployed to help us understand
problems. Who could possibly object? Certainly not I.
Hirschl’s clarion call is to expand our frameworks outward in three ways.
First, he asks us to expand our focus geographically, away from the established
democracies of Europe and North America; this is something that the field has
belatedly begun to do in the last few years with superb results.1 Second,
Hirschl wants the field to expand methodologically, away from narrow
lawyerly doctrinalism toward truly interdisciplinary inquiry, and he points out
the many contributions of social scientists to the endeavor.2 Third, he asks us
to expand our temporal framework.3 Hirschl’s own methodology of returning
to earlier exemplars of comparison, ancient and modern, is itself an example
here. Hirschl also points out that, within any particular system, we ought not be
limited in our focus on the moment courts decide cases but rather should take a
broader frame. Instead we ought to look at moments of constitutionalization,
constitution-making and constitutional politics beyond the judiciary. This is
another way of expanding the temporal frame, away from the moment of
judicial decision.

* Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Deputy Dean, University of Chicago Law
School; Research Associate, American Bar Foundation. Thanks to James Fleming for
organizing the symposium, and to my co-panelists for thoughtful discussions.
1 See RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15-17 (2014).
2 See id. at 15.
3 See id. at 77 (“Contemporary discussions in comparative constitutional law often
[ignore the fact that] [m]any of the purportedly new debates in comparative constitutional
law have early equivalents, some of which date back over two millennia.”).
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***
Let’s begin with this last point. With apologies for the American
parochialism, I have characterized the narrow focus on court decisions the
“Seventh Inning Problem” in Comparative Constitutional Law.4 The analogy is
to a baseball fan who pays overly felicitous attention to a late inning. Imagine
yourself as a fan going to watch the Toronto Blue Jays with a good friend; let’s
call him Shai. You arrive very late, at the top of the seventh inning. You see
which team is batting, and so can deduce who is the home team, since the
home team in baseball always bats in the bottom half of the inning. You look
at the scoreboard and see the score, which allows you to ascertain who is
winning and losing. But you do not know how the score came to be that way or
why.
You proceed to watch the seventh inning. As baseball innings go, the
seventh is fairly important—not just in the top ten but somewhat higher.
Sometimes a team will score a decisive comeback run; other times a team will
shut out the other side and close in on victory. (Indeed, this past October, the
aforementioned Toronto Blue Jays played one of the most remarkable and
important seventh innings in baseball history, winning the National League
Championship Series with a three-run comeback.5) It is also the case that the
seventh inning has some aesthetic or theatrical advantages over other innings.
The inning is always accompanied by a rousing ritual of community, in which
the whole stadium joins in the classic song “Take me out to the ballgame.”
You find this experience stirring and entertaining, as a rare opportunity to join
with masses of others in a collective activity; you might also note to yourself
that the overly formal civic hymn “God Bless America” is not sung in Canada.
Imagine that you as a fan watch the inning as it plays out with great
excitement. One team scores some runs, perhaps taking the lead from the other.
The fans cheer, the tension builds, perhaps the inning ends with a dramatic
play in the field. Then . . . you leave. You walk out of the stadium. Maybe you
hear the final score of the game on your car radio on the drive home. Maybe
you don’t. But either way, you do not observe the outcome first hand.
4 Portions of this section are adapted from Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Constitutional
Law: The Seventh Inning Problem, MD. CONST. L. SCHMOOZE (2012),
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1140&context=schm
ooze_papers [https://perma.cc/A8XD-RVM9]. I join a long line of distinguished and
undistinguished work pursuing baseball analogies in law. For a critical review, see Chad M.
Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball Metaphors in Judicial
Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 33-39 (1994) (critiquing judges for using baseball
analogies). But see Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)He Will Come: Judicial
Opinions, Metaphors, Baseball, and “The Sex Stuff,” 28 CONN. L. REV. 813, 813-14 (1996)
(rebutting Oldfather).
5 Mike Axisa, That Blue Jays-Rangers 7th Inning May Be the Craziest You’ll Ever See,
CBSSPORTS.COM (Oct. 14, 2015, 8:08 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/eye-onbaseball/25340061/that-blue-jays-rangers-7th-inning-may-be-the-craziest-youll-ever-see
[https://perma.cc/AH2M-82GU].
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The absurdity of this example is not too far from where we started as a
discipline in recent decades. Focusing too much on court cases in the
constitutional “game” has precisely the same structure as the baseball fan who
watches only one late inning. It means that we miss many of the most
important questions—where does constitutional order come from? Who are the
parties and what are they really fighting about? How does the court have the
power it does? And what is the impact of the decision on real outcomes after
the court decision? These questions can only be examined by broadening our
temporal and conceptual frame. And they provide the real context for the
judicial setting that we examine in the equivalent of slow motion.
The judicial setting presents us with players, one of whom is “losing” in the
status quo and so brings a claim. There is a prior “score” in terms of
distribution of resources between the litigants. The court case involves
attempts to secure advantage, and requires litigants and their lawyers to engage
in interesting strategic calculations, much as managers and players do. It is
surely important for observers to understand the rules of the legal “game” in
order to know how points are scored. But knowing who wins or loses the case
is not the end of the game. In many constitutional settings, the politics of
enforcement and implementation are at least as complex as those of the judicial
settings. As generations of socio-legal scholars have debated, do the court
decisions really matter much at all?6 Even if they do, the final score is not
known until well after the court decision.
To stretch the analogy further, a single game does not a season make. Cases
unfold in sequence; baseball games stretch over a 162-game summer. To
understand what is going on in the game—why the pitcher throws a slider or
why the fielder is shading to the left—one might want to know the batter’s
tendencies, what happened last time the two teams met, what the pitcher would
like the batter to think for the next pitch, etc. Only by broadening out fully can
we make sense of some of the individual moves in each game. Similarly,
doctrine unfolds over time and across fields of law. We know that the most
influential part of a judicial opinion is often not the holding, but the rationale.7
Sometimes simply following a line of cited precedent—an “internal” move in
the game—will not reveal the broader strategy and pattern.8
Why has the nascent field of comparative constitutional law not adopted a
broader frame? There is a two-fold answer. First, in many countries, the study
of constitutional law is embedded in broader academic cultures dominated by

6 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 1-8 (1991).
7 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS ON THE SUPREME COURT 40-41 (1964); see
also Herbert M. Kritzer, Martin Shapiro: Anticipating the New Institutionalism, in THE
PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 387, 392 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).
8 See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 22, 30 (1964) (“A skilful
legal craftsman can usually reach the result he wants without directly overruling established
cases or obviously making new law.”).
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formalism.9 The seventh inning problem is really just the old critique
associated with legal realism, political jurisprudence, and the law and society
movement. One would think that we are all realists now, but that is not the case
in much of the world, or at least not much of the world with which I am
familiar.10 Second, within the United States, part of the problem is that many
of the early leaders of the field were Americanists who have become interested
in comparative problems rather than comparativists interested in constitutional
law.11 This leads to what we might perhaps characterize as overemphasis on
the role of courts.12
To be sure, as Hirschl’s own work reminds us, judicialization has proceeded
in many other milieus.13 The seventh inning is genuinely more important than
it used to be, in more parts of the world. It may be the case that the
interdisciplinary literature that he celebrates has come to look at more parts of
the game. The problem with the field of comparative constitutional law is not
the focus on courts per se, but rather, as Comparative Matters so wisely
reminds us, the possibility of selection bias in terms of what issues, and
countries, are deemed important.14 Cases in which judges have grappled with
problems close to the hearts of Americans have received more attention than
those that have not;15 countries where courts are prominent have received more
attention than those in which they are more marginal.16 To be sure, there have

9 See Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Introduction: Toward a Constitutionalism of the Global
South, in CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH: THE ACTIVIST TRIBUNALS OF INDIA,
SOUTH AFRICA, AND COLOMBIA 1, 8-9 (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado ed., 2013) (“A significant
part of Latin American, African, Asian, and Eastern Europe[an] legal academia is still
dominated by various forms of legal formalism.” (footnotes omitted)).
10 Indeed, it is not the case in the United States either. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 300 (2016).
11 Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L.
409, 410-11 n.8 (2003).
12 See, e.g., Stéphanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle, Introduction: Exploring
Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 1, 2-5
(Stéphanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle eds., 2009).
13 See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 169-210 (2004) (discussing the judicialization of politics,
foundational nation-building questions, and fundamental restorative justice dilemmas).
14 See, e.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 1, at 205-17.
15 Compare id. at 218 (discussing the lack of U.S. media coverage of a monumental
ruling by the Supreme Court of India on public health and poverty eradication), with
Botswana’s Top Court Rejects Government Bid to Ban Gay Rights Group, REUTERS (Mar.
16,
2016,
4:47
PM),
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN0WI2CQ
[https://perma.cc/BU5V-ZT6F] (illustrating the relatively robust U.S. media coverage of gay
rights cases in Africa).
16 See, e.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 13, at 8-9 (choosing to focus on constitutional changes
in Canada, New Zealand, and Israel precisely because of the strong common law tradition
and centrality of the courts).
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been important correctives in recent years with the explosion of attention to
courts in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, as well as the international level.
But there is much more to be done, and more to be said.17
***
Taking this line of thought seriously requires us to start at the beginning: the
very formation of constitutional order. Anna di Robilant refers to this, in her
comment in this symposium, as a “big question.”18 How are constitutions
made? And how should we study this question? We are fortunate that the
leading figure in the study of constitution-making remains Jon Elster, certainly
one of the modern “grandmasters” (to use Hirschl’s term) of social and
political science.19 Indeed, many of the central concepts in the field remain his,
from a series of articles in the 1990s and 2000s, and a 2013 book, Securities
Against Misrule.20 Elster’s core contributions in the comparative constitutional
field are several: wrestling with the importance of precommitment;21
articulating the role of reasons, passions, and interests in constitutional
design;22 the importance of constituent assemblies;23 and the hourglass
metaphor of public participation, which holds that public involvement ought to
be broad at the outset of the constitution-making process, then narrow during a
phase of bargaining among interests, then broaden again at the end of the
process with public ratification for legitimation.24 Elster’s frameworks and
concepts continue to guide our thinking on the making of constitutions, helping
to understand the process in clear and bold terms, with concepts that are easy
to deploy.
But it is also the case that Elster has strong views on methodology. He is not
a fan of statistics or economic models. Indeed, in one recent pair of essays—

17

See, e.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 1, at 3, 212 (“[V]ery few of the leading ‘state of the
discipline’ collections contain substantial analysis of the north/south gaps as such . . . .”).
18 Anna di Robilant, Big Questions Comparative Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1325, 1328
(2016).
19 HIRSCHL, supra note 1, at 127 (identifying Montesquieu as “the first grandmaster of
comparative public law” in addition to naming others who might also be worthy of the title
of grandmaster).
20 JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS (2013).
21 Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (2003).
22 Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J.
364 (1995).
23 Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 J. CONST. L. 345
(2000) (comparing the constitution-making processes of the 1787 Federal Convention in
Philadelphia and the 1789-1791 Assemblée Constituante in Paris).
24 See Jon Elster, Legislatures as Constituent Assemblies, in THE LEAST EXAMINED
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 181, 197 (Richard W.
Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
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perhaps reflecting deep post-financial-crisis pessimism—Elster seems to argue
against the use of modern social science in constitutional or institutional
design.25 This puts him in apparent tension with Hirschl’s latest book.
Let us spend a moment on Elster’s argument. He first critiques the social
sciences for “excessive ambitions.”26 Decrying formal theory that is far
divorced from reality, and the complex statistical models that are dominant in
political science departments these days, Elster goes on to critique rational
choice, behavioral economics, and empirical analysis. To quote: “[A] nonnegligible part of empirical social science consists of half-understood statistical
theory applied to half-assimilated empirical material.”27 He thinks that the
reason for this sorry state of affairs is that social science departments are stuck
in suboptimal equilibria: career incentives have reinforced a turn toward
technical complexity.28 Technique and the search for causal relationships, with
the aspiration of replicating predictive sciences, come at the expense of what
can be called “retrodiction”—the ex post analysis and explanation of events
after they occur. The latter is, in Elster’s view, an achievable goal—the focus
on prediction impossible.29 The failure of departments of social science means
that they are hardly the kinds of places to which we might turn for our
understanding of constitutions.
In the second essay, Elster focuses on institutional and constitutional design.
He argues for an approach that we might call Hippocratic—given that we
know little about the effects of institutions and their internal interactions, we
ought to focus mainly on the prevention of bad results rather than optimal
institutional design.30 This is a kind maximin strategy.31 Elster goes on to
critique much normative political theory. He (correctly in my view) identifies
that much political theory ultimately rests on empirical arguments about the
effects of chosen institutions on outcomes, which (because of his skepticism

25

See Jon Elster, Excessive Ambitions, CAPITALISM & SOC’Y, Oct. 2009, at 1 [hereinafter
Elster, Excessive Ambitions I] (critiquing these models generally); Jon Elster, Excessive
Ambitions (II), CAPITALISM & SOC’Y, Jan. 2013, at 1 [hereinafter Elster, Excessive Ambitions
II] (building on his previous criticism of excessive reliance on statistical modeling, and
arguing that the potential for constitutional and institutional designers to justify selfinterested policy through the use of manipulated statistical models cautions against the use
of such models).
26 Elster, Excessive Ambitions I, supra note 25, at 1.
27 Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted).
28 See id. at 19-20.
29 Id. at 23-24.
30 Elster, Excessive Ambitions II, supra note 25, at 5; see also Aziz Z. Huq, Hippocratic
Constitutional Design, in ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE (Aziz Z. Huq & Tom
Ginsburg eds., forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 49, 53) (on file with the author).
31 See MARTIN J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 361 (2004) (explaining
that maxminimization strategy requires one to assume the worst possible outcome for each
action, and then select the action for which the worst outcome is the best).
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about social science) cannot be verified.32 Many claims about “ought” depend
on assumptions about the “is”,33 but our understanding of the world rests on
causal theories that are underspecified and poorly worked out.34
These are harsh critiques of social science. If correct, do they undermine
Hirschl’s prescriptions? Not necessarily, I will argue, though they do call into
question some of Elster’s own work on constitutional design, which remains
the gold standard in the field.
Let us begin with Elster v. Hirschl. Hirschl is not arguing, obviously, for
poorly specified causal theories, or half-baked empirical approaches. He is
sufficiently pluralistic that many methods fall into his big tent. Thankfully, he
accepts that careful large-n work has a place as well as small-n work; Hirschl
thus seems more catholic than Elster.35 The key for Hirschl, I suspect, is rigor
and attention to method. But it is important to recognize that method must be
suited to the problems at hand. It seems to be a valid critique that many social
scientists start with method and then move to problem. As practitioners of
comparative constitutional studies, we should take the opposite approach: let
the method fit the problem rather than the reverse. The two scholars would
likely agree on this proposition.
Having made a case that Hirschl survives Elster’s critique, let us now ask
whether Elster himself does so: late Elster v. early Elster. To do so requires
some attention to his method. In his classic work on constitutional design,
Elster’s approach was to focus on paradigmatic cases, using what looks like a
most different cases design.36 In Forces and Mechanisms in Constitutional
Design, for example, he compared and contrasted the French and American
constituent assemblies to examine the roles of secrecy, transparency, and
deliberation; he also looked at the relative roles of interests, passion, and
reasons in the production process.37 He found, among other things, that the
French structure of transparency was more conducive to arguing than to
bargaining, as members of the public heckled and pressured representatives
during deliberations. This setting was one in which passion was the dominant
force. He contrasts this setting with the American closed-door sessions in

32

Elster, Excessive Ambitions II, supra note 25, at 5-6 (giving an example of determining
the optimal fact-finder in a trial).
33 See Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 66-67 (2006) (discussing
Hume’s work on the relationship between ought and is).
34 Elster, Excessive Ambitions II, supra note 25, at 27-28 (stating that certain attempts to
develop policy in light of empirical studies “presuppose a knowledge of social
causality . . . that, in most cases, we simply do not possess”).
35 HIRSCHL, supra note 1, at 193-94 (explaining that the low use of both large-n and
small-n studies is a deficiency in current comparative constitutional law and should be
remedied).
36 Id. at 253-56 (explaining this method).
37 Elster, supra note 22, at 376-77 (reasons, passions, and interest); id. at 384-87 (secrecy
and deliberation).
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Philadelphia, which promoted bargaining over arguing, and the predominance
of interest over passion.38
Elster’s own normative view is that the task of constituent assemblies is to
maximize the role of reason, and to minimize the roles of passion and interest,
in constitution-making. While there may be a certain amount of passion and
interest required to obtain and sustain constitutional bargains, these are not
desirable qualities.39
Yet, as may be apparent to the reader, there is a serious tension between
Elster’s early and late normative diagnoses. If constitutional designers are to be
guided by reason, as he wishes, they must be able to predict the effects of
chosen institutions on outcomes. This requires designers—and national publics
who will bless the decision—to utilize social science reasoning of a kind that
sophisticated practitioners use in academic work. This seems like a heroic
assumption, both for designers and especially for national publics.40
It is also the kind of reasoning that the late Elster says is impossible. If most
social scientists cannot predict the effects of institutions, then how can
designers—many of whom are chosen not for expertise but because of power
or the need for representation—make reasoned choices? I submit that early
Elster’s normative theory thus fails an important test, that of being possible.
For normative theory to be relevant, it ought to have a minimal relation to
feasibly achievable outcomes. To return to the baseball analogy, non-feasible
normative theory is like a manager designing a strategy for players that are not
on his or her team and will never be. Think 2015 World Series champion
Kansas City Royals’ manager Ned Yost41 planning out the lineup of the 1934
Yankees.
In an important corrective, Nathan Brown argued that real world
constitution-making cannot and should not be limited to reason.42 A certain
amount of self-interest is required in order to facilitate political investment in
the constitutional order, which in turn is a crucial feature of its survival.43
Political and legal stability requires continuous investment in existing
arrangements. Furthermore, extending public participation may undermine
reason—in some contexts, scholars have argued that citizens, to a greater

38

Id. at 283-88.
Id. at 394-95.
40 Sidney Verba, Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn Out to Be a Nightmare?, 1
PERSP. ON POL. 663, 668 (2003).
41 Jeffrey Flanagan, Reigning Men: Royals Win First Series Since ‘85, MLB.COM (Nov.
2,
2015),
http://m.mlb.com/news/article/156229646/2015-royals-are-world-serieschampions [https://perma.cc/9AWD-V25B].
42 See Nathan J. Brown, Reason, Interest, Rationality, and Passion in Constitution
Drafting, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 675, 675 (2008) (“The problem is not too much passion and
interest but too little attempt to engage them.”).
43 See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 87-88 (2009).
39
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degree than elites, are motivated by self-interest.44 This might imply that
participation should perhaps be limited until the final stage of constitutional
adoption, when proposals have already been formulated and need only
approval.
In addition, Brown points out, passion may be a valuable component of
motivating interest in and support of the constitutional order, which in turn
may be important for enforcement.45 In the classic models of citizen
coordination, constitutional enforcement is conceived of as a kind of collective
action problem.46 Each citizen would like to enforce the rules, but without
knowing what other individuals will do, might be reticent to come out in the
streets to enforce themselves. To overcome this mass coordination problem
might require some individual to be sufficiently motivated by passions as to
undertake the risky strategy of mobilizing others.47
In short, late Elster undermines early Elster’s normative proposition for the
priority of reason over passions and interests. The optimal amount of passion
and interest are not zero, and so a Hippocratic approach cannot say that these
motives are to be excluded or minimized entirely. Indeed, one might go further
along the skeptical route and say that the “right” mix of reasons, passions, and
interests to sustain constitutions is not only unknown, but unknowable. If so,
we ought to ignore early Elster entirely.
Another example concerns Elster’s proposition that constitutions ought to be
written by specially designated constituent assemblies operating under a veil of
ignorance, rather than sitting legislatures.48 Elster’s method in coming up with
this proposition is, essentially, to use a technical term, “armchair reasoning.”
He reasons his way among ideal types of constitution-makers, attributing to
them motives and mechanisms that seem logical. In particular, he fears that
legislatures, if left to their own devices, will be too self-interested in terms of
institutional and political interest, and so will produce constitutions more
weighted to the legislative power. Note first that Elster’s emphasis on
legislative self-interest ignores the possibility that legislation can be highly

44 See, e.g., THOMAS R. CUSACK, A NATIONAL CHALLENGE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL:
CITIZENS, ELITES AND INSTITUTIONS IN REUNIFIED GERMANY 82-85, 91-93, 103 (2003)
(showing that East German citizens, compared to their elites, were more likely to favor
socialist policies that benefited them relative to West Germans because of East Germany’s
lower wealth).
45 Brown, supra note 42, at 683.
46 See PETER C. ORDESHOOK, A POLITICAL THEORY PRIMER 32-37 (1992); Barry R.
Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 245, 246-51 (1997).
47 See Weingast, supra note 46, at 261 (positing that in order to maintain or achieve a
stable democracy, citizens must on occasion act not in their own self-interest, but according
to their values).
48 Elster, supra note 20, at 203.

1356

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1347

emotional or might even result in the exercise of deliberative reason.49 It also
assumes that constituent assemblies are less self-interested than legislatures
are; in other words, he follows Bruce Ackerman’s idea that constitutional
politics are systematically different from ordinary politics.50
These arguments of Elster’s are, in principle, testable with empirical
evidence. The question is, what evidence would convince the armchair
reasoner? Co-authors and I tried to test one of Elster’s propositions by
examining whether legislatively produced constitutions had systematically
more legislative power than those produced by constituent assemblies or
executives.51 Our measure of legislative power drew on Steven Fish’s index of
de facto legislative power.52 We found that constitutions in which the
executive was the dominant producer had less legislative power than those
produced either by legislature or constituent assemblies. But the latter
categories were indistinguishable.53 In other words, we found no evidence for
legislative self-dealing because there was no correlation between legislative
involvement in drafting and legislative power.
As Popperian social scientists, we cannot reject Elster’s conjecture; but we
can say that available evidence using our crude but transparent test is not
consistent with it. Would this convince Elster? It is hard to say. Our test is
simple and relies only on cross-tabulations, not causal models. Perhaps it
would meet Elster’s approval, as he critiques complex statistical methods by
noting: “Where the medians and means (and basic cross-tabulations) don’t
persuade, the argument probably isn’t worth making.”54 Our simple empirical
methods might be enough to convince him to revise his assumption about
institutional self-interest. Alternatively, though, he might question our sample,
as we do not segment the sample by democracy.55
A further critique is that Elster’s own suggestion that legislators should stay
out of constitution-making may violate his maxim to do no harm. As Donald
Horowitz points out in a superb reply to Elster:
49 Carol Sanger, Legislating with Affect: Emotion and Legislative Lawmaking, in NOMOS
LIII: PASSIONS AND EMOTIONS 38 (James E. Fleming ed., 2013).
50 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991).
51 Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Justin Blount, Does the Process of ConstitutionMaking Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 201 (2009); Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg &
Justin Blount, The Citizen as Founder: Public Participation in Constitutional Approval, 81
TEMP. L. REV. 361, 361 (2008) (examining the effect of ratification on constitutional
outcomes).
52 M. STEVEN FISH & MATTHEW KROENIG, THE HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL LEGISLATURES:
A GLOBAL SURVEY (2009) (describing their “Legislative Power Survey”).
53 Ginsburg, Elkins & Blount, supra note 51, at 213.
54 Elster, Excessive Ambitions I, supra note 25, at 24 (quoting AMAR BHIDÉ, THE
VENTURESOME ECONOMY: HOW INNOVATION SUSTAINS PROSPERITY IN A MORE CONNECTED
WORLD 244 (2008)).
55 ELSTER, supra note 20, at 206 n.64 (2013) (criticizing another study of ours for
including authoritarian constitutions).
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If all one cared about was the conflict of interest manifested in the two
roles of legislator and constitution maker, this is an inarguable
proposition. The special benefits for legislators are a form of rent seeking
that is exceedingly undesirable. But is conflict of interest the only, or the
most important, issue in planning for a new constitution? . . . If a
constitution is to be made by a body whose members are ineligible to
serve later as legislators, such a requirement precludes the service of a
large number of knowledgeable people who might wish to serve later in
the legislature.56
Do no harm is unobjectionable at first blush. But if it is epistemically
challenging to predict good outcomes, how can we be so confident that we are
avoiding bad ones? That too would require fully specified causal models with
high quality data to test them. As may be apparent, “do no harm” may be an
excessively cautious maxim, since there is often an existing set of
arrangements that may have little to recommend it other than that it exists.57
Omission can be as harmful as commission.
This point has implications for constitutional advice. Some scholars, such as
Mark Tushnet, are skeptical about the possibility of constitutional advice.58
Constitutional success, according to Tushnet (recalling Alexander Hamilton),
is determined mainly by the local conditions on the ground, and thus much
constitutional advice-giving is, in his view, pointless.59 Yet, as even Tushnet
acknowledges, there is value in providing information about innovations
elsewhere.60 While no two constitutional design situations are ever alike, there
may be the possibility of learning from others’ experiments and experiences.
Designers should not be kept ignorant of these developments. And in analyzing
these comparators, are we to simply use anecdote? This does not seem an
improvement given the possibility of drawing the wrong conclusions.
Surely it is important to be cautious in extending social science results to
any particular location, given the small number of constitutional systems. No
serious scholar would argue for the mechanistic application of institutions from
one system to another. Elster’s observation of the vast differences between the
social and natural sciences is surely right. But rigor in method is still a worthy
aspiration.
There is a point to this extended comment on Elster and his skepticism about
social science of just the kind that Hirschl calls for. Elster’s approach, if taken
to the extreme, strikes me as insufficiently ambitious. Just as we can do better
than watch only a single inning of a baseball game, we can also try to get
56

Donald L. Horowitz, Comment on “Excessive Ambitions (II)” (by Jon Ester),
CAPITALISM & SOC’Y, Jan. 2013, at 4.
57 Id. at 3.
58 Mark Tushnet, Some Skepticism about Normative Constitutional Advice, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1473, 1474-75 (2008).
59 Id. at 1474.
60 Id. at 1475 n.7.
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purchase on constitutional studies through a vigorous, careful, and rigorous
social science. Surely critical cautions about method are important. But I
would submit that by failing to try to produce useful knowledge, we are
dooming constitution-makers to the sin of omission. We need, as Hirschl
shows, more social science rather than less.
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